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The Future is Femtech: Privacy and Data Security 






The year is 2264 and the bracelet on your wrist flashes a white light. 
You hardly flinch.  In under twenty seconds, a small capsule dispenses 
from a cylinder above your desk.  You grab it without giving it much 
thought. In it lies a pill and a small note.  When you read the note, you are 
reminded of a distant childhood memory of when your second-grade class 
sampled a ‘Chinese fortune cookie’ as part of Interplanet History Day at 
your virtual school.  You vividly remember your excitement upon seeing 
the fortune paper inside the cookie which was quickly met with confusion 
as you read, “A good way to keep healthy is to eat more Chinese food.”1  
Food no longer exists.  You are accustomed to only ingesting synthetic 
tablets manufactured to specifically maintain your body’s vitals and 
nutrient levels.  This time, your note reads “ergocalciferol + ferrous 
sulfate.”  You realize your body must be experiencing vitamin D and iron 
deficiencies in response to the hormonal imbalance caused by your 
monthly cycle.  You ingest the pill and the white light on your bracelet 
turns off. 
While the above futuristic scenario seems all too implausible, 
emerging technologies addressing women’s health are on the rise.2  Female 
Technology, colloquially referred to as Femtech3 in the technology and 
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 1.  Fortune Cookie Message Archive, FORTUNE COOKIE MESSAGE, http://www.fortunecookie 
message.com/archive.php [perma.cc/3MFY-2T8B]. 
 2. Berenice Magistretti, The rise of femtech: women, technology, and Trump, VENTURE BEAT 
(Feb. 5, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/02/05/the-rise-of-femtech-women-technology-
and-trump/ [perma.cc/LVA8-V78L]. 
 3. The term “Femtech” was coined by Ida Tin, co-founder of the fertility-tracker Clue who states 
on her blog, “an enormous range of technology innovations such as temperature patches, insertable 
devices, wristbands, clip-ons, smart jewelry, DNA testing related to fertility and many other devices 
and data analytics helping people figure out their female health . . . addressing female health needs 
through technology: femtech.”  Ida Tin, The Rise of a New Category: Femtech, CLUE (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://helloclue.com/articles/culture/rise-new-category-femtech [https://perma.cc/ECC8-JY89]. 
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health industry, is one of the largest growing sectors catching the eyes of 
venture capitalists4 and entrepreneurs alike.  What was largely an ignored 
health area, is now a feeding ground for investors who realize the market 
potential of Femtech5 because nearly half of the globe is female.6  In 2015, 
the digital health industry as a whole raised $5.8 billion from investors, $82 
million of which was invested into nine Femtech companies.7 
Femtech is a term applied to a category of software, diagnostics, 
products, and services that use technology to focus on women’s health.8  
The Femtech industry is comprised of digital or standard health tools 
focusing on fertility solutions, period-tracking, pregnancy and nursing care, 
women’s sexual wellness, and reproductive system health care.9  Products 
currently on the market range from Elvie’s pelvic-floor strengthening 
device,10 to period-tracking apps like Clue11 and Glow.12  The Femtech 
industry also includes products like L.’s organic cotton tampons and 
chemical-free, bioethical condoms.13 
Recall the futuristic yet-all-too-plausible scenario described at the 
beginning of this introduction?  A bracelet triggered the release of a pill to 
assist the woman in regulating her health vitals.  Such a technology can 
only exist to the extent it analyzes the woman’s personal health status in 
real time.  While a bracelet that monitors and dispenses personalized health 
vitamins has yet to launch, similar technologies regulating female health 
are currently on the market.  Many of the technologies available include a 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Jill Richmond, The New Year Of Optimism For Femtech, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2016, 5:55 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillrichmond/2016/12/31/the-new-year-of-optimisim-for-
femtech/#1f7d7dcc54c9 [perma.cc/BGF4-YUAP]. 
 6. The World Bank estimates the female population is roughly 49.5 percent of the world’s total 
population, based on age and sex distributions of UN World Population Prospect countries.  THE 
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS [perma.cc/4UBW-EFBM]. 
 7. Richmond, supra note 5. 
 8. See generally Mona Fromm, The Femtech Revolution, HANDELSBLATT GLOBAL (Mar. 4, 
2017, 2:00 PM), https://global.handelsblatt.com/companies-markets/the-femtech-revolution-713865 
[perma.cc/Z23K-HNLZ]; see Heather Mack, Clue Gets $20M to Enhance Intelligence of Period-
Tracking App, Grow Team, MOBIHEALTH NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/ 
content/clue-gets-20m-enhance-intelligence-period-tracking-app-grow-team [perma.cc/B4LQ-ZA65]. 
 9. See generally Heather Mack, In-Depth: Digital Health Innovation In Fertility and Women’s 
Health- Not So Niche Anymore, MOBIHEALTH NEWS (Dec.22, 2016), https://www.mobihealthnews. 
com/content/depth-digital-health-innovation-fertility-and-womens-health-%E2%80%93-not-so-niche-
anymore [perma.cc/3XPQ-H8M4].  
 10. Elivie Trainer, https://www.elvie.com/shop/elvie-trainer [perma.cc/4NHJ-XRSZ]. 
 11. CLUE, https://www.helloclue.com/ [perma.cc/R46K-UVTD]. 
 12. GLOW, https://glowing.com/ [perma.cc/4A2N-RG3A]. 
 13. L., https://thisisl.com/ [perma.cc/2V54-NNJW]. 
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device synced to a companion mobile application14 or involve only the 
singular use of a mobile application.15  When a user first begins using the 
device and companion mobile application, the user is prompted to input 
personal information into the mobile application which can range from 
name and age to more personal information like health history.  The mobile 
application is an integral feature of these health technologies because the 
mobile application stores, analyzes, and provides the user with personalized 
reports of her health status. 
Of the most popular Femtech products currently on the market is the 
Elvie Trainer.  The Elvie Trainer, an “award-winning Kegel trainer for a 
stronger pelvic floor” visualizes a woman’s pelvic floor movements in real 
time and provides biofeedback accessible through a companion mobile 
application16 to “strengthen [a woman’s] pelvic floor muscles for fewer 
leaks within weeks.”17  Typically, kegal strengthening includes “clench-
and-release” exercises of pelvic floor muscles that improve or eliminate 
bowel and bladder leakage.18  Women who suffer from incontinence—the 
inability to control one’s bladder resulting in urinary leaks—after giving 
birth, often engage in pelvic floor strengthening exercises.19  The Elvie 
Trainer provides women with a more sophisticated and high-tech 
alternative to targeting these muscles through its Elvie Trainer device and 
companion mobile application. 
To begin, a user simply needs to purchase the Elvie Trainer kegal and 
register as a user on the Elvie mobile application.  The user then turns the 
kegal device on and places the small, silicone device inside her vagina.  
She then connects to the mobile application to begin workouts that target 
her pelvic floor muscles.  Motion and force sensors are part of the device’s 
design that sync with the mobile application to track the user’s progress 
 
 14. The Sonata Smart Breast Pump is a double-electric breast pump that pairs with a companion 
application, the MyMedela app.  Through the MyMedela app, users can directly access International 
Board Certified Lactation Consultants and view statistical data collected from the breast pump device.  
SONATA SMART BREAST PUMP, http://www.medelabreastfeedingus.com/products/905/sonata-smart-
breast-pump#tabs-horizontal1 [perma.cc/59Y7-PGTT]. 
 15. Clue is a fertility tracker application that operates without a companion device.  Clue,  
https://www.helloclue.com/ [perma.cc/R46K-UVTD].  The application relies on a user to provide 
personal information and continually input information about her health and body including any period-
related symptoms, descriptions of bodily fluids, or any changes she notices. 
 16. Elvie, https://www.elvie.com/shop/elvie-trainer.  
 17. Elvie, https://www.elvie.com/ [perma.cc/BJ5Y-BPD9]. 
 18. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CONTINENCE, https://www.nafc.org/kegel/ [perma.cc/3WU5-
G2F4] [hereinafter NAFC]. 
 19. WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/urinary-incontinence-oab/womens-guide/bladder-control-
menopause#1 [perma.cc/5SHN-FN3R]. 
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and provide her with personalized analytics.20  The application allows the 
user to freely provide personal data but personal data may also be collected 
automatically when using the application.  Personal data includes the user’s 
name, contact information, geographic position and workout data.  The 
Privacy Policy detailed in the company’s Terms and Conditions makes 
clear that “[f]ailure to provide certain Personal Data may make it 
impossible for this Application to provide its services.”21 
Kindara, a fertility-tracking application offers to help a woman “[g]et 
pregnant faster, avoid pregnancy naturally, or better understand [her] body 
with the world’s most powerful and useful fertility charting system.”22  As 
a fertility solution that can operate on analytics calculated solely through 
the application, the application requires the user to input personal data at 
the onset of use.  Personal data includes details surrounding the user’s 
cervical fluids, menstruation, sex and health-related history.  Kindara’s 
Privacy Policy acknowledges the sensitivity of some of this information 
and advises the user to “choose carefully regarding whether and if [she] 
will use the Service.”23 
Glow, Inc., an ovulation and health-tracking application, boasts its 
“powerful ability to crunch vast amounts of data to investigate the science 
behind . . . menstruation, sex, fertility, pregnancy, parenthood, and 
beyond.”24  The application indicates that “the more data [entered], the 
more accurate [the] predictions.”25  Glow’s Privacy Policy states that 
personal data such as name, gender, and contact information will be 
collected at the onset of registration with the application.  The Privacy 
Policy also provides that the application will allow the user to input 
individualized data which “include[s] sensitive personal data about 
personal health issues and/or information related to . . . past, present, or 
future physical or mental health condition[s].”26  Importantly, and distinct 
from the aforementioned health applications, Glow displays a HIPAA 
Complaint notice on its website.27 
The significant commonality between the applications described 
above and many others on the market, is the applications’ reliance on users’ 
personal health information.  The disclosure and use of personal health 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Terms and Conditions, Privacy Policy, Elvie Mobile Application (last updated Jan. 22, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/6VEN-2FUC], [perma.cc/488W-JRUG]. 
 22. Kindara, https://www.kindara.com/ [perma.cc/6V5E-C7MG]. 
 23. Kindara Terms of Use, KINDARA [perma.cc/VFR2-FPN9]. 
 24. About Glow, GLOW, https://glowing.com/about [perma.cc/5SGA-R5UQ]. 
 25. Glow, https://glowing.com/glow [perma.cc/GSA6-FBEU]. 
 26. Glow Privacy Policy, GLOW, https://glowing.com/privacy [perma.cc/82FN-A98R]. 
 27. Id. 
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information is met with promises to better provide users with more accurate 
personalized data.  In effect, much of the personal health information stored 
on these applications is collected freely and automatically because users are 
encouraged to disclose such information.28 
Under HIPPA, “protected Health Information” (“PHI”)29 defines what 
types of personal health information covered entities are required to 
protect.  The definition of PHI is a focal point for regulation of related 
digital health information.  A question of law exists as to whether the 
personal health information collected, stored and used by Femtech 
applications, should fall under the definition of  PHI and consequentially be 
subject to federal regulation and oversight.  For the reasons set forth in this 
paper, privacy and data security regulations concerning personal health 
information must be amended to protect users of Femtech mobile 
applications because current laws do not regulate Femtech mobile 
applications.  Specifically, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) must be amended to minimize the potential 
data and privacy risks associated with Femtech technologies. 
 
II. THE PROBLEM−WHY FEMTECH PRODUCTS AND ITS LACK OF 
REGULATION ARE OF GROWING CONCERN 
 
Femtech companies who collect and store personal health data often 
fall outside the purview of HIPAA.30  While subject to Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTC Act”) regulations,31 Femtech companies are largely 
left unregulated on a federal level as it pertains to privacy and data security 
requirements regarding PHI.  Of the emerging Femtech companies, most of 
them do not fall under the Code of Federal Regulation’s definition of a 
covered entity.32  This exposes Femtech application users to a myriad of 
privacy and data security issues.  Expansion of HIPAA’s covered entity 
definition is of recent rhetoric33 as a greater number of mobile health 
(“mHealth”) applications continue to emerge.34  Proposed solutions include 
 
 28. See NAFC, supra note 18. 
 29. What is PHI?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/ 
hipaa/what-is-phi/index.html [perma.cc/Q3AQ-E4HJ]. 
 30. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 32. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014). 
 33. See generally Jamie Lynn Flaherty, Digital Diagnosis: Privacy and the Regulation of Mobile 
Phone Health Applications, 40 AM. J.L & MED. 416 (2014); see also Nicholas P. Terry, Regulatory 
Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 143 
(2017). 
 34. See Peter McLaughlin & Melissa Crespo, The Proliferation of Mobile Devices and Apps for 
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a broad sweeping of mHealth applications under HIPAA’s covered entity 
definition.35  However, such a broad proposal unnecessarily burdens all 
Femtech mobile health companies, regardless of the technology invented or 
the amount of personal health information collected and stored.  Covered 
entities must be redefined to include Femtech applications that are synced 
to ‘biosensing products’36 and applications that provide similar analytics.  
A distinction must be made between certain Femtech products and services 
that analyze highly personal information often measured by body-invasive 
devices and Femtech applications that offer simple tracking services.  In 
drawing this distinction, the regulations imposed on simple Femtech 
applications will be lessened and allow such applications to more freely 
enter the market because of the less stringent regulations that are in place.  
Therefore, only sophisticated, high-tech devices and their companion 
applications that collect personal health information will be subject to 
HIPAA regulations. 
However, HIPAA reform should not rely solely on expanding the 
definition of HIPAA’s “covered entities” because such a solution does not 
adequately address the implications of an ever-changing technological 
landscape.  Rather, reform should also focus on updating industry standards 
as it relates to physical and technical safeguards mandated under HIPAA.  
Specifically, encrypted data need not be a solution a company can elect to 
comply with but, instead, be a required measure that Femtech and similar 
mHealth applications must implement to ensure encrypted data becomes 
the “commercially-reasonable standard.”  This will ensure that technical 
safeguard requirements under HIPAA more accurately reflect modern 
technologies to better protect Femtech mobile application users. 
 
A.  CURRENT FEMTECH COMPANIES’ PRIVACY POLICIES ARE INADEQUATE AND 
EXPOSE USERS TO POTENTIAL DATA BREACHES 
 
The notion that consumers who voluntarily use products and services 
are thereby impliedly consenting to the policies in place by such companies 
is not novel.37  The FTC Act plays a large role in ensuring that consumers 
 
Healthcare: Promises and Risks, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 21, 2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/ 
practitioner-contributions/the-proliferation-of-mobile-devices-and-apps-for-health-care-promises-and-
risks/ [perma.cc/E27R-ZY8T]. 
 35. Flaherty, supra note 33. 
 36. The term “biosensor” is short for “biological sensor” which is defined as “chemical sensing 
device in which a biologically derived recognition is coupled to a transducer, to allow the quantitative 
development of some complex biochemical parameter.”  Sally Robertson, What are Biosensors? (Feb. 
26, 2019) https://www.news-medical.net/health/What-are-Biosensors.aspx [perma.cc/4S3G-ZDX6]. 
 37. This notion does not run afoul from the concept that policy terms must not be inconspicuous 
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are made aware of company practices and acts, or at the very least, that 
customers are not misled about deceptive practices.38  Because current 
Femtech mobile applications are unregulated, privacy and data security 
practices are left to the discretion of the company. 
Ava, for example, a fertility tracking bracelet and companion 
application that offers insight about fertility, pregnancy and female health,39 
states the company has “implemented commercially reasonable procedural, 
physical and technical safeguards to protect [a user’s] personal information 
against loss, theft or alteration as well as unauthorized access and 
disclosure.”40  The Privacy Policy details its data storing and processing 
practices which indicates that “information is stored and processed on 
servers located in the [US], either by [Ava] or by a third party . . . such as 
Amazon Web Services, or in any other country in which Ava or its service 
providers may operate.”41 
Flo, a period tracking application that “uses artificial intelligence for 
the most accurate menstrual cycle predictions,”42 states it takes 
“commercially reasonable measures to protect all collected information”43 
but further indicates that it “cannot guarantee the security of the 
[application].”44  Unlike Ava, Flo’s Privacy Policy does not disclose the 
company’s data storing and processing practices. 
After a comparison of Ava, Flo, Elvie, Kindara, and Glow’s privacy 
policies, it is apparent Glow is the only company with a privacy policy that 
prominently identifies the company’s satisfactory HIPAA compliance.45  
Unlike the other companies, Glow is considered a “business associate” 
under HIPAA’s covered entity definition because Glow offers users the 
ability to elect into the “Glow Fertility Program Patient Services 
 
and must provide the user with reasonable notice.  See Vernon v. Qwest Communs. Int’l, Inc., 857 F. 
Supp. 2d 1135, 1149 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 39. AVA, https://www.avawomen.com/ [perma.cc/CRJ3-5EU8]. 
 40. Ava Privacy Policy, AVA, https://www.avawomen.com/privacy/ [perma.cc/WN26-BJJT]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. FLO, https://flo.health [perma.cc/P934-WEJY]. 
 43. Privacy Policy, FLO, https://flo.health/privacy-policy [perma.cc/44SY-RU29]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. GLOW, https://glowing.com [perma.cc/GSA6-FBEU] (“HIPAA Compliant” emblem on the 
bottom right of the homepage).  HIPAA does not provide a certification indicating that a company or 
organization is fully compliant.  A “HIPAA” certification solely means that a person or persons of the 
company have “successfully undergone a course designed to train and teach . . . the information . . . 
[needed] to enable [a] business or organization to become HIPAA compliant.” HIPAA certifications are 
issued by many online courses. HIPAA Compliance Tools, https://www.hipaacomp liance.org/hipaa-
certified/ [perma.cc/BQ3T-9XPC]. 
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Agreement” (“Fertility Program”).46  Glow’s Fertility Program enables 
Glow to “act as a conduit between (a) health care providers offering 
fertility-related services, [and] (b) other persons involved in the arranging, 
provision or financing of health care services.”47  As “business associate,” 
Glow is therefore required to comply with HIPAA.  To comply with 
HIPAA, Glow explicitly discloses that it “maintain[s] physical security 
measures to guard against unauthorized access to systems and use[s] 
safeguards such as firewalls and data encryption.”48  No other privacy 
policy makes references to data encryption.49 
Although these case studies are merely a sample, they provide ample 
color as to the commercially reasonable safeguards Femtech companies 
choose to employ.  Most often, encryption as a means of data security falls 
wayside to other technical safeguards such as utilization of secure servers.  
This is presumably attributed to cost and other extenuating circumstances.50  
The HIPAA Security Rule defines technical safeguards as “the technology 
and the policy and procedures for its use that protect electronic protected 
health information and control access to it.”51  Covered entities may 
essentially “use any security measure that allow [them] to reasonably and 
appropriately implement the necessary standard for protection.”52  Covered 
entities are required to encrypt PHI during data transmission but can choose 
the type of encryption and whether such data will remain encrypted 
thereinafter.53  Femtech mobile applications, on the other hand, are free to 
employ any security measure as the company so chooses—which includes 
not implementing any sort of security measure. 
Such lenient standards result in inadequate privacy and data security 
protection for Femtech mobile users.  A prime example of this problem is 
Yahoo! Inc’s. (“Yahoo”) recent data breaches.  As an e-mail and internet 
service provider, Yahoo collects and stores individuals’ personal 
information (much like Femtech mobile applications) ranging from an 
individual’s contact information to credit card and social security 
 
 46. Privacy Policy, GLOW, https://glowing.com [perma.cc/82FN-A98R]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. This determination is made in reference to a blind sample I conducted of seven Femtech 
Applications currently on the market. 
 50. Elizabeth Snell, HIPAA Technical Safeguards: A Basic Review, HEALTHIT SECURITY (Nov. 
11, 2014), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/hipaa-technical-safeguards-basic-review [perma.cc/7D7T-
SWGX]. 
 51. Snell, supra note 50; see generally, The Security Rule, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html [perma.cc/QDK2-B63W]. 
 52. Snell, supra note 50. 
 53. Id. 
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identification.  An examination of Yahoo’s recent data breaches highlights 
the catastrophic consequences to users’ privacy because of outdated 
technical safeguards implemented under inadequate and lenient laws. 
 
 
B. AN EXAMINATION OF YAHOO!, INC.’S UNENCRYPTED DATA BREACHES 
ILLUSTRATES THAT POTENTIAL DATA BREACHES ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR AMONG 
FEMTECH MOBILE APPLICATIONS. 
 
In a putative class action against Defendant Yahoo, Plaintiffs alleged 
because of Yahoo’s history of data security failure between 2014-2015, 
Yahoo should have been put on notice (prior to the third data breach in 
2016 that led to this lawsuit) of the need to enhance their data security.54  
Plaintiffs specifically alleged that Yahoo “fail[ed] to cryptographically 
store the passwords in its database.”55  Plaintiffs proffered evidence to 
support Yahoo’s deliberate decision to not encrypt their user data, as former 
Yahoo security staffers interviewed said requests made by Yahoo’s security 
team for new tools and features, such as strengthened cryptography 
protections were rejected on the grounds that the requests were too costly, 
complicated, or were simply too low a priority.56 
This demonstrates the inherent tensions that arise when companies are 
too free to decide the ways in which they will implement security 
measures.  While the Northern District Court of California has yet to issue 
a final judgment on the merits, the parties have entered into a preliminary 
settlement agreement in which the court relies on Plaintiffs’ expert Mary 
Frantz’s 92-page report regarding Yahoo’s data security.57 “The report 
shows repeated failures to follow industry-standard security practices, 
extensive knowledge of ongoing security breaches beginning in 2008 with 
failure to adequately respond, failure to provide adequate staffing and 
training, and failure to comply with industry standard regulations.”58 but if 
the allegations are true, issues surrounding the efficacy of companies’ 
privacy and data security policies are of harrowing concern. 
 
 54. In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
the case has yet to proceed to adjudication on the merits of the case. 
 55. In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2017 WL 
3727318, *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017). 
 56. Id. at *2. 
 57. As of March 3, 2019, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 
San Jose Division denied the parties’ preliminary class action settlement agreement.  In re Yahoo! Inc. 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2019 WL 387322,*5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 
2019).  
 58. Id.  
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Of noteworthy mention is at the time the Yahoo breaches took place, 
Yahoo’s Privacy Policy stated the company adopted “commercially 
reasonable standards,” similar to the privacy policies of current Femtech 
applications.59  This indicates that either Yahoo failed to meet modern 
commercially reasonable standards or that industry-wide, commercially 
reasonable standards are insufficient guarantees of security, and therefore, 
the industry as a whole needs stricter regulations. Publicly available 
company privacy policies therefore present a myriad of issues surrounding 
the validity, efficacy and  veracity of company privacy practices. 
Companies must be held accountable for failure to comply with industry 
standard regulations and evermore, for flagrantly disregarding such 
standards. 
The Femtech industry faces impending data breaches similar to that of 
Yahoo’s.  With the rise of Femtech technology, comes an even greater risk 
of industry-wide privacy and data protection issues.60  Femtech companies 
adopt commercially reasonable standards when it comes to privacy and 
data security.  But by current law, Femtech mobile applications are left 
unregulated because the laws in place are constructed in such a way that 
Femtech companies need not comply with any sort of security or data 
privacy requirements.  There is no legal requirement for companies to 
implement updated and adequate privacy and data safeguards nor is there 
any recourse for companies that fail to adopt “commercially reasonable 
standards.”  Therefore, stricter privacy and data security regulations 
surrounding PHI are necessary now more than ever, specifically as it 
relates to Femtech mobile applications. 
 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ADDRESS PHI AS 
IT RELATES TO FEMTECH MOBILE APPLICATIONS 
 
Much of the problem surrounding Femtech privacy and data security 
issues pertains to the fact that the personal health information collected, 
stored, and analyzed by Femtech mobile applications qualifies as PHI yet is 
unregulated.  Protected Health Information is defined in Title 45 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations, Section 160.103 as “individually identifiable 
health. . . that is transmitted by electronic media; maintained in electronic 
 
 59. In re Yahoo!, 2017 WL 3727318 at *2. 
 60. Steven Roosa, A Deep Dive into the Privacy and Security Risks for Health, Wellness, and 
Medical Apps, IAPP (Apr. 6, 2015) https://iapp.org/news/a/a-deep-dive-into-the-privacy-and-security-
risks-for-health-wellness-and-medical-apps/ [perma.cc/G7EF-LE74]. 
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media; or transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.”61 
“Individually identifiable health information” is 
 
[I]nformation that is a subset of health information, including 
demographic information collected from an individual, and: (1) Is 
created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or 
health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or 
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the 
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future 
payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and (i) That 
identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which there is a 
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the 
individual.62 
 
Simply stated, PHI is “personally identifiable information in medical 
records, including conversations between doctors and nurses about 
treatments . . . [and] also includes billing information and any patient-
identifiable information in a health insurance company’s computer 
system.”63 
Femtech mobile applications encourage users to input their health 
history into the applications to provide more accurate analytics.  Some 
applications encourage users to voluntarily input similar information that is 
listed in a patient’s medical records.  Due to the nature of the data collected 
and analyzed, the application monitors a user’s health status to the same 
extent a physician or gynecologist would.  In effect, the Femtech mobile 
applications and medical records often contain the same level of personal 
health information. 
The right to privacy covers patients’ medical records by requiring 
physicians and similar personnel to protect patients’ personal health 
information from being disclosed or stolen.64  Much of the intent 
surrounding a physician’s duty to ensuring that a patient’s medical records 
remains confidential stems from the Hippocratic Oath.65  However, as 
technology advances and various mobile applications provide users with 
similar health metrics and analysis, so too should Femtech mobile 
applications be subject to similar duties of confidentiality.  Therefore, 
 
 61. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014). 
 62. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014). 
 63. What is Protected Health Information (PHI)?, TRUE VAULT https://www.truevault.com/ 
protected-health-information.html [perma.cc/S8A4-5XME]. 
 64. See generally 45 C.F.R § 160 (2014). 
 65. Mark A. Rothstein, The Hippocratic Bargain and Health Information Technology, J.L. & 
MED. ETHICS (Spring 2010). 
 
330 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 15:2 
 
Femtech mobile applications that collect, store, and analyze users’ personal 
health information should be subject to PHI regulations under Title 45 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 160.103. 
Accordingly, Femtech mobile applications should be subjected to 
similar laws that regulate PHI.  The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)66 and the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(“FTC Act”)67 regulate PHI and health information to varying degrees.  
Thus, HIPAA and the FTC Act should regulate Femtech mobile 
applications as well. 
 
A. HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT  
 
HIPAA is a federal law that promulgates regulation of PHI by setting 
forth compliance requirements for data privacy and security purposes.68  It 
was enacted in 1996 in response to patients’ inherent privacy concerns 
following the medical care industry’s digitization of medical records.69  
When enacted, the legislature solely addressed the prospect of healthcare 
providers, clearinghouses and intermediaries accessing patients’ PHI,  and 
therefore HIPAA’s scope  was narrowly tailored.70  HIPAA only regulates 
and applies to specific entities referred to as “Covered Entities.”71 
Covered Entities72 includes three categories of persons or entities that 
fall under the purview of HIPAA: healthcare providers or health care plans, 
clearinghouses, and business associates.73  Examples of healthcare 
providers and health plans include physicians, clinics, nursing homes, 
health insurance companies, HMOs, and Medicaid and Medicare.74  
Clearinghouses include entities that process nonstandard health information 
received by another entity into a standard electronic format.75  Examples of 
clearinghouses include payment systems and technology infrastructures.76  
 
 66. 45 C.F.R § 160 (2014). 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 68. 45 C.F.R § 160 (2014). 
 69. The History of HIPAA & The Consequences of a HIPAA Violation, RECORD NATIONS, 
https://www.recordnations.com/articles/history-hipaa/ [perma.cc/TB5W-CRBW]. 
 70. Jamie Lynn Flaherty, Digital Diagnosis: Privacy and the Regulation of Mobile Phone Health 
Applications, 40 AM J.L & MED. 416, 423−24 (2014). 
 71. 45 C.F.R § 160 (2014). 
 72. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Are You a Covered Entity?, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES https://www. 
cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-Simplification/HIPAA-ACA/AreYouaCovered 
Entity.html [perma.cc/A6UD-BS4K]. 
 75. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014). 
 76. Are You a Covered Entity?, supra note 74. 
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Business associates refers to “a person or entity that performs certain 
functions involving the use or disclosure of PHI on behalf of, or provides 
services to, a covered entity.”77  Examples of business associates include a 
CPA firm whose accounting services to a health care provider involve 
access to [PHI]78 or an “independent medical transcriptionist that provides 
transcription services to a physician.”79  Only those persons or entities 
falling under the statute’s definition of a covered entity” must comply with 
HIPAA regulations.80 
In general, Femtech mobile applications do not fall under HIPAA’s 
definition of a covered entity.  Hence, Femtech mobile applications need 
not comply with HIPAA regulations. Femtech mobile applications do not 
fall under the first category of “physician or health care provider” because 
the applications are not operated by physicians or health care providers.  
Most Femtech companies are independent companies that create 
specialized technologies to serve a niche demographic—like women 
seeking to get pregnant naturally and without the use of in-vitro 
fertilization or hormones, or women addressing issues of incontinence 
through pelvic floor strengthening.  Femtech mobile applications do not fall 
under the second category of “clearing houses” because they are neither 
payment systems nor technology infrastructures.  HIPAA’s business 
associate category is the only  potential category that could sweep a 
Femtech mobile application under HIPAA regulation.  However, Femtech 
companies tend to find ways to avoid such categorization. 
For the most part, Femtech companies function independently from 
physicians or health care providers and restrict the disclosure of the 
information collected by the application.  Some company policies state, 
however, that in the event a user chooses to disclose the information 
collected, stored, and analyzed by the application, the company will not be 
responsible for transmitting nor disclosing any information to a third-party, 
such as a physician.  Such a restriction severs any cross-functioning between 
the Femtech mobile application and a physician or healthcare provider.  This 
subsequently allows the company to skirt around HIPAA requirements. 
Arguably the most important provisions of HIPAA’s requirements are 
embodied in the HIPAA Administrative Simplifications Regulations.81 
 
 77. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014). 
 78. Business Associates, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/index.html [perma.cc/3P8R-NQSV]. 
 79. Are You a Covered Entity?, supra note 74.  
 80. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2017). See Flaherty, supra note 70 at 416; Nicholas P. Terry, Regulatory 
Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 143 
(2017). 
 81. Flaherty, supra note 70 at 416. 
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HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, Security Rule, and Breach Notification Rule 
outline parameters for PHI disclosure and safeguards that a covered entity 
must implement,82 establish patient rights pertaining to their PHI records,83 
and provide notice requirements for breaches of PHI.84 
The Privacy Rule “sets national standards for when [PHI] may be used 
and disclosed.”85  Generally, disclosure of PHI requires patient 
authorization.86  In limited situations, disclosure without authorization may 
be permitted.87  The Privacy Rule also establishes rights that a patient may 
exercise to examine PHI records, obtain a paper trail of where the patient’s 
PHI has been sent, and to request corrections.88 
The Security Rule “requires appropriate administrative, physical and 
technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and security of 
electronic protected health information.”89  To meet this requirement, 
covered entities must “[c]onduct an accurate and thorough assessment of 
the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of electronic protected health information.”90  An entity may 
then be required to implement physical91 or technical92 safeguards to ensure 
the protection of PHI.  One technical safeguard addressed in the Security 
Rule is the implementation of encryption.93  While not a required 
safeguard, “the encryption implementation specification is addressable, and 
must therefore be implemented if, after a risk assessment, the entity has 
determined that the specification is a reasonable and appropriate safeguard 
in its risk management of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
 
 82. Id.; see also The Security Rule, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY https://www.hhs.gov/ 
hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html [perma.cc/QUS6-752S]. 
 83. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/index.html [perma.cc/AEK7-PDTR]. 
 84. HIPAA Basics For Providers: Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules https://www. 
cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads 
/HIPAAPrivacyandSecurityTextOnly.pdf [perma.cc/PPC9-3B3K]. 
 85. Id. 
 86. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/index.html  [perma.cc/AEK7-PDTR]. 
 87. Instances of required disclosures absent authorization include when the U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services is undertaking a compliance investigation or review or enforcement action. 
Id. 
 88. HIPPA Privacy Rule, supra note 83.  
 89. HHS, The Security Rule, Health Information Privacy https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-prof 
essionals/security/index.html  [perma.cc/A64P-JDPQ]. 
 90. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(II)(A) (2017). 
 91. 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (a)(2)(ii) (2017). 
 92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(1) (2017). 
 93. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(iv) (2017). 
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[PHI].”94  An entity may choose to not implement a specification after a 
risk assessment but must document that determination and implement an 
equivalent alternative measure to meet the safeguard standard (and include 
documentation of the rationale for this decision).95 
The Breach Notification Rule “requires covered entities to notify 
affected individuals, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
(“HHS”), and in some cases, the media, of a breach of unsecured PHI.96 
Breach notification obligations differ depending on the number of 
individuals affected by the breach.97  Breach notifications must be provided 
without unreasonable delay.98  Such a requirement would ensure that 
Femtech policies provide users with the necessary notices and affirmative 
action necessary after a breach.  Kindara’s Privacy Policy, for example, 
merely indicates that the company “may attempt to notify [a user or] . . . 
may post a notice on the Website or the App”99 in the event of a data 
breach.  Users who do not live in a jurisdiction that otherwise provides 
them with the legal right to receive written notice of a data breach must 
notify the company to elect such protection.100  The Breach Notification 
Rule requirements would resolve problematic breach notification policies 
that are currently in place by Femtech companies. 
The Privacy Rule, Security Rule, and Breach Notification Rule are 
effectively meaningless as they relate to Femtech mobile applications 
because Femtech companies fall outside HIPPA’s purview.  The most 
important of the three rules that pertains the Femtech mobile applications is 
the Security Rule.  Data breaches of highly sensitive personal health 
information collected, stored, and analyzed by these applications should be 
a top of mind concern for users.  However, as Femtech companies are not 
required to implement any specific security and data protection technical 
 
 94. FAQ, Health Information Privacy, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/2001/is-
the-use-of-encryption-mandatory-in-the-security-rule/index.html [perma.cc/PN3D-D6LB]; 45 C.F.R. § 
164.312(a)(2)(iv) (2017); 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2017). 
 95. Id. 
 96. HIPAA Basics For Providers: Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules https://www. 
cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/HIPA 
APrivacyandSecurityTextOnly.pdf [perma.cc/X6PE-GJQE]. 
 97. 45 C.F.R. § 164.406(a) (2017) (“[f]or a breach of unsecured protected health information 
involving more than 500 residents of a State or jurisdiction, a covered entity shall, following the 
discovery of the breach as provided in § 164.404(a)(2), notify prominent media outlets serving the State 
or jurisdiction”). 
 98. HIPAA Basics For Providers: Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules,  https://www. 
cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/HIPA 
APrivacyandSecurityTextOnly.pdf. 
 99. Privacy Policy, KINDARA, https://www.kindara.com/privacy-policy [perma.cc/6PWM-C5ZF]. 
 100. Id. 
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safeguards, Femtech mobile application users face a high risk of data theft. 
 
B.  THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT (“FTC ACT”) 
 
The FTC also promulgates regulation of health information by 
prohibiting companies from engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”101  Specific to companies who collect 
and use personal health information, companies may not mislead 
consumers about the companies’ privacy and data security policies as it 
relates to collected and used personal health information.102  The FTC Act 
establishes disclosure and notice requirements regarding a company’s 
practices thereby promoting the access of information consumers have in 
relation to the use of their health information.103  One way a health 
company can comply with the FTC Act is by not burying key facts in a 
privacy policy, terms of use, or HIPAA authorization form.104  Compliance 
with the FTC Act can also be met by informing the consumer about the full 
scope of how personal health information can or will be used prior to the 
consumer making a material decision to send or disclose personal 
information.105  Companies required to abide by the FTC Act requirements 
may not be subject to HIPAA compliance and vice versa. 
While the FTC Act serves an important purpose by mandating that 
companies fully inform users of company policies, the FTC Act does not 
regulate the manners, mechanisms, and means of how a company’s 
technological infrastructure must operate to ensure consumer’s privacy 
rights are upheld.  For example, the FTC Act does not outline the 
parameters of technological safeguards a company must implement to 
ensure privacy and data security remains optimal.  The FTC Act, therefore, 
does not adequately address the risks of privacy and data breaches among 
Femtech mobile applications. 
 
C.  SOLUTION: HIPAA MUST BE FURTHER REFORMED TO REDEFINE “COVERED 
ENTITIES” AND REQUIRE COMPANIES TO IMPLEMENT ENCRYPTION AS A TECHNICAL 
SAFEGUARD. 
 
Many of the risks posed by Femtech mobile application privacy and 
 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 102. Sharing Consumer Health Information? Look to HIPAA and the FTC Act , FED. TRADE 
COMM’N https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/sharing-consumer-health-informa 
tion-look-hipaa-ftc-act  [perma.cc/WT9G-VAAB]. 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2017). 
 104. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 102. 
 105. Id. 
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data security issues can be addressed by expanding the definition of 
“covered entities” under HIPAA and by specifying certain technical 
safeguard requirements codified in the Security Rule. 
 
i. HIPAA’s Covered Entities Definition Should Include Femtech Applications 
Synced with Biosensing Devices. 
 
Recent proposals for HIPAA reform call for a broad sweeping of 
mHealth applications, which would include Femtech applications, under 
the covered entity umbrella.  However, such expansion would deter 
innovation and entry of Femtech and mHealth applications from entering 
the market.  For example, simple, inexpensive applications such as step-
trackers and food-log applications would be subjected to meeting an 
unnecessarily high, technical safeguard threshold.  Instead, Femtech 
applications should be categorized into two distinct groups: (1) biosensing 
devices synced with companion applications and (2) general health 
trackers.  Covered entities should be expanded to include the former 
because of the highly sensitive information collected and analyzed by such 
products. 
Biosensors are devices that convert biological recognition element 
into a signal output.106  Biosensing technologies allow for continuous 
physiological monitoring in a wide range of products.107  Biosensing 
products include those like Ava, the fertility tracking bracelet, and more 
commonly, blood glucose biosensors for people with diabetes or other 
related health issues.  Other biosensing products that will soon enter the 
market include NextGen Jane’s “smart tampon.”108  This smart tampon will 
use biosensors to collect and analyze a woman’s biological changes 
predictive of disease.  The device will also be able to screen a woman for 
sexually transmitted infections.109  Similar to current Femtech products like 
the Elvie Trainer, NextGen Jane’s ‘smart tampon’ and other biosensing 
products rely on the devices’ biosensors to monitor personal health 
information.  Their companion applications likewise store and analyze 
users’ personal data that is collected. 
These sorts of applications differ from traditional health trackers that 
merely log the number of steps a person takes in a day.  The food a person 
eats at each meal would hardly constitute personal health information in 
 
 106. Malay Gandhi & Teresa Wang, The Future of Biosensing Wearables, ROCK HEALTH, 
https://rockhealth.com/reports/the-future-of-biosensing-wearables/ [perma.cc/S35Y-2AQY]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. NextGen Jane, http://www.nextgenjane.com/ [perma.cc/A33H-UG8Q]. 
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comparison to the metrics offered by a smart tampon.  Traditional health 
logs do not store and analyze a high volume of personal data to the extent 
emerging biosensing products do.110  By identifying this stark difference, 
regulation can better address the inherent privacy concerns among users of 
these two groups of Femtech applications.  In turn, applications with low-
privacy concerns would not need to implement technical safeguards like 
data encryption.  This will then allow these applications to better succeed 
on the market because they will not need to expend resources to implement 
technical safeguards.  Due to the advanced technology inherent in 
biosensing devices, it is not unreasonable to require that sophisticated 
products implement technical safeguards like data encryption. 
States are looking to adopt privacy and data security legislation as a 
means to regulate emerging technologies because of the very reason that 
with the advent of sophisticated technologies comes the inherent 
expectation that heavier regulations will be imposed.111  For example, 
Illinois and Texas have adopted state laws that regulate employers who 
collect biometric data from their employees.112  This is in response to 
emerging technologies that are replacing traditional clock-in methods using 
time-stamp cards by replacing it with biometric identification.  Biometric 
data includes identifying information from a person’s fingerprint, 
voiceprint, or the scan of a person’s retina, iris, face or hand.113  
Specifically, Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”),114 
requires employers who collect biometric data to implement physical and 
technical safeguards pertaining to the collection, retention, and destruction 
of such information.  While the cost of such safeguards is of relevance, 
state and federal legislatures anticipate the growth of technology and 
understand the risks that such growth poses without adequate legislative 
oversight.115  Requiring employers—who wish to utilize, collect and store 
biometric data—to comply with BIPA regulations is of a similar essence to 
requiring Femtech companies—who wish to collect and store personal 
 
 110. See generally 7 Wearables That Go Beyond Fitness Trackers and Smart Watches ELYSIUM 
HEALTH (Mar. 31, 2018), https://endpoints.elysiumhealth.com/next-generation-wearables-2018-b0c8be 
461151 [perma.cc/7LT6-VZTV]. 
 111. Lily Hay Newman, Medical Devices are the Next Security Nightmare, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2017 
10:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/ [perma.cc/6K 
9P-MT2E]. 
 112. Jay Hux, Collecting Employee Biometric Data Could Prove Costly in Illinois, Society for 
Human Resource Management, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Sept. 19, 2017) https://www. 
shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/Pages/Collecting-Employ 
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 114. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15 (2017). 
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health information—to comply with HIPAA regulations. 
Employees have already begun to rely on BIPA regulations to ensure 
that companies who capture, collect, and store, employees’ biometric data 
fully comply with recent laws that are in place.116  United Airlines became 
one of the latest companies hit with a putative class action in November 
2017 for failure to comply with BIPA regulations.  United Airlines 
employees alleged the company failed “to inform workers in writing that 
their biometric data was being captured, collected, and stored.”117  Further, 
the plaintiffs allege that the biometric clocking systems that United Airlines 
has implemented puts the workers at great risk of data theft.118  Many of 
these concerns mirror those of Femtech mobile users face because 
companies who choose to capture, collect, store, or analyze users’ personal 
information put users at a high risk of data theft.  The putative class action 
against United Airlines is another example of why companies must be held 
to a higher standard to ensure that privacy and data security risks are 
mitigated.  Regulatory compliance provides users with adequate protection. 
 
ii. The Accessibility of Encryption Software Merits Its Requirement under HIPAA. 
 
While expanding the definition of “covered entity” is of paramount 
importance, the effects of HIPAA can only be of value if adequate security 
requirements are likewise adopted and enforced.  Specifically, in 
addressing data breach concerns similar to those of Yahoo’s, HIPAA must 
be amended to require that biosensing devices and companion mobile 
applications implement encrypted data. 
In its current form, the HIPAA Security Rule allows companies to 
implement various technical safeguards to protect PHI but does not 
mandate that companies encrypt collected data.119  The Security Rule 
impliedly acknowledges the vast array of privacy and data security issues a 
specific company may face but the Security Rule was implemented at a 
time when certain technological safeguards were costly or viewed as 
extraneous.120  However, technological solutions now exist that can enable 
every mHealth and Femtech application to meet HIPAA requirements 
through data encryption software. 
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Technology platforms, such as Aptible121 and Amazon Web Services 
(“AWS”),122 enable companies to more easily implement modernized 
technical safeguards, like cryptography.  Aptible is specifically on a 
mission to bring companies in full HIPAA compliance by helping 
companies builds private, secure software systems.  The company’s goals 
are to transform the experience of digital health engineers and application 
developers while reducing the costs and impediments typically associated 
with integrating data encryption software.123 
Amazon Web Services provides extensive cloud computing services 
including data protection and storage.  Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) 
allows a company to encrypt data either through server-side encryption or 
client-side encryption.  This data protection includes in-transit and at-rest 
protection.  An AWS user can select its desired services and thereby only 
needs to pay for whichever individual product it uses. This enables a 
company to customize its technology infrastructure and provides a 
company with inexpensive encryption options.124 
The existence of these technologies, juxtaposed with the lack of 
Femtech companies’ utilization of such technologies, illustrates the 
unwilling nature of companies to freely implement available safeguards.  
This exemplifies the trend of unregulated industries who typically take the 
less costly and more profitable approach at the expense of user 
protection.125  As was the case with the telecommunications industry, only 
through regulation can technological safeguard standards be raised industry 
wide.126  The Smartphone Bill is a prime example of such regulation.127 
In 2014, San Francisco District Attorney George Gascon and New 
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman introduced a smartphone “kill-
switch” bill in response to the rise of smartphone theft.  The bill required 
smartphone manufacturers to implement a “kill-switch” in every device 
that would render the device inoperable if stolen.  At the time, the kill-
switch, an anti-theft technology, existed but was not integrated on every 
 
 121. APTIBLE, https://www.aptible.com [perma.cc/4EDB-KXJM]. 
 122. AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/ [perma.cc/C2H2-AS6Z]. 
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device or if it was integrated, required the user to opt-in.128  The 
telecommunications industry adamantly opposed such technology claiming 
it was unnecessary and an undue burden on manufacturers.  However, once 
major telecommunications companies’ hidden financial incentives were 
exposed, the Smartphone Bill eventually passed and mandated that all 
smartphones and tablets manufactured after July 2015 come equipped with 
a kill-switch.129  Reports indicate a substantial decline in smartphone theft 
in recent years attributed to the passage of this bill.130 
Similar outcomes can be expected by requiring Femtech and mHealth 
applications to use data encryption.  But an important distinction exists 
between telecommunications manufacturing companies and Femtech 
companies: financial stability.  Telecommunications companies were 
required to implement kill-switches because the technology existed and the 
purported financial burdens caused by such implementation were of low 
and questionable concern.  Telecommunications companies feared a loss in 
revenue sales because cellphone users would no longer need to buy brand 
new smartphones every time theirs were stolen.  Furthermore, there was 
minimal concern addressing these companies’ increased expenditures on 
the actual implementation of the anti-theft technology.  However, a 
financial concern does exist regarding Femtech and health companies’ 
integration of encrypted data.  Many of these companies are start-ups that 
do not have the financial prowess like that of AT&T, Sprint, and Apple.  In 
order to promote prosperous innovation, Femtech and mHealth companies 
must not be stifled by undue financial burdens. 
To address this concern, the law must find  a fine balance between 
protecting users’ personal health information and promoting innovation.  
The distinction between the information collected by two Femtech 
categories, biosensing devices and their companion mobile applications and  
simple tracking applications, balances these interests.  Such a  distinction 
best serves femtech companies’ financial interests while furthering 
innovation because as companies develop and rely on highly-advanced 
biosensing devices, in congruence with companion applications, the 
information collected is inherently more comprehensive and personal.  
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to require high-tech companies who 
collect, store and use highly-sensitive personal information to implement 
high-tech safeguards.  Thus, I propose, that to resolve mobile health 
applications' privacy and data security concerns, the law must require 
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An underlying concern addressed by requiring certain Femtech 
applications to implement technical safeguards such as encryption is the 
proposition advanced by Moore’s Law.131  Moore’s Law, an axiom in the 
computing industry, provides that technology will double every two 
years.132  Recent innovations in the Femtech and mHealth industry illustrate 
the accuracy of this axiom.  With the speed of technological advancements 
comes the even greater need for reform to combat the risks posed by such 
technology.  Technology regulations are not intended to stifle technological 
advancements and achievements but rather provide guidelines that foster 
technological growth.  Regulations should be viewed as imperative because 
there is little use in a technology that poses exponential risks that outweigh 
any benefits derived from use of the technology. 
In response to TrumpCare proposals, the health industry is creating 
technology that outweighs the risks of conservative proposals that leaves 
millions of Americans without adequate care.133  Through the use of 
Femtech devices, the health industry is shifting and patients are taking 
health matters into their own hands,134 figuratively and literally.  Femtech 
and mHealth applications enable users to receive health care from the 
comfort of their own homes, without the intervention of a physician or 
health care provider.  But as the health industry shifts from physician-
focused care to technologies that enable patients to self-monitor their 
health, duties of confidentiality likewise shift.  A patient’s right to privacy 
and a physician’s duty to keep her digital health records confidential is an 
extension of the Hippocratic Oath.135  The Femtech and mHealth companies 
need to be held to similar, if not the same, standards and should be 
accountable for protecting users’ privacy and data information. 
To ensure that Femtech and mHealth companies are held to higher 
standards, these companies must be regulated.  Likewise, Femtech mobile 
application users need adequate legal protection to rely on when companies 
 
 131. Hux, supra note 106. 
 132. Id.; MOORE’S LAW, http://www.mooreslaw.org/ [perma.cc/J5K5-8NZE]. 
 133. Magistretti, supra note 2. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See generally Rothstein, supra note 65; Hippocratic Oath, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hippocratic-oath [perma.cc/6JMQ-QK4J]; The Hippocratic Oath, 
PBS (Mar. 27, 2001) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html [perma.cc/DL 
A9-ZWZ9]. 
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fail to protect their personal health information.  As technology continues 
to advance and the metrics provided by these Femtech companies becomes 
of greater societal value, personal health information should continue to be 
appropriately protected.  By expanding the definition of “covered entities” 
and requiring encryption as a means of ensuring technical safeguards are 
up-to-date, HIPAA will better serve users of Femtech mobile applications 
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